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The SARS epidemic in Hong Kong began on 10.3.03 when 11 healthcare workers from ward 8A of Prince of Wales Hospital went on sick leave simultaneously. It turned out to be a severe and prolonged epidemic, affecting 1,755 individuals over a period of approximately three months. The last SARS case was confirmed and reported on 11.6.03, although the patient had been isolated in hospital since 2.6.03. The epidemic was declared officially over on 23.6.03 when WHO removed Hong Kong from the list of areas with recent local SARS transmission, based on the rationale that 20 days (i.e. twice the incubation period) had lapsed since the last SARS case was isolated, suggesting that the chain of infection was interrupted and terminated. 
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The Prince of Wales Hospital Outbreak
3.31
Prince of Wales Hospital is a 1200bed public hospital located in the New Territories East region. It is also the teaching hospital of the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The SARS outbreak in the hospital occurred at a time when there was no knowledge of the existence of a novel coronavirus, let alone the duration and degree of infectiousness. Additionally, the pattern of symptoms had not yet been defined; WHO only first described the symptom complex of SARS on 15.3.03, followed by numerous revisions in keeping with the steady accumulation of scientific knowledge about the SARS coronavirus.
3.32
The Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak affected a total of 239 individuals. Its epidemic curve is depicted in Figure 3 .5.
Monday
3.33
The outbreak first came to light on 10.3.03 when the hospital management was notified that a group of 11 healthcare staff, comprising 7 doctors and 4 nurses, working in ward 8A of the medical department had gone on sick leave simultaneously. A possible communicable disease outbreak was suspected. Ward 8A was immediately closed to admission and visitors.
Tuesday
3.34
On the next day, 11.3.03, there was media coverage of the sick healthcare staff with respiratory infection symptoms in Prince of Wales Hospital. DH's New Territories East Regional Office initiated contact with the hospital management who confirmed the abnormal pattern of sick leave amongst staff working in ward 8A. A special meeting was convened by the hospital later that morning, with participation of clinicians, the infection control team, hospital management and the community physician of DH's New Territories East Regional Office. Relevant points of the meeting were as follows - The no-visiting policy was modified to restriction in visiting, with visitors required to wear surgical masks, disposable gowns and gloves All hospital staff on sick leave would be recalled to undergo physical examination in an emergency medical clinic An epidemiological study of the sick healthcare staff would be conducted by DH's New Territories East Regional Office using a purpose-designed questionnaire. This included items such as clinical, travel and exposure history, as well as movement in wards and health status of close contacts, to provide a basis for working out the case definition and estimating the incubation period.
3.35
By late evening, more hospital staff had become sick, including three cardiothoracic surgeons who had visited ward 8A the previous week. Significantly, two key action items were completed by then. First, DH's New Territories East Regional Office successfully interviewed 26 of the 36 hospital staff on sick leave, allowing epidemiological analysis to be undertaken. The symptoms were noted to be predominantly fever and chills. Advice on early treatment and personal hygiene was given. The remaining 10 could not be contacted or refused interview, but they were subsequently followed up.
3.36
Second, the hospital management recalled all healthcare staff on sick leave to undergo physical examination. By then, the number had increased to 50. Of these, 23 were assessed to require immediate hospital
Hospital visiting policy
The rationale to change no-visiting policy to ward 8A to that of restricted visiting were threefold -
The uncertainty of the source or the causative agent at the time and the intense media publicity made ward 8A patients extremely anxious and agitated. Continuing with the novisiting policy could have resulted in situations in which patients would be discharging themselves against medical advice, increasing the risk of spreading infection to the community The no-visiting policy was also regarded as having a deterrent effect to potential patients, preventing them from presenting early to hospital It was considered that appropriate droplet precautionary measures with mask, gown and gloves would confer adequate protection to visitors. admission: 15 had fever of more than 38 o C and the remaining 8 had chest x-ray signs of pneumonia. This first group of 23 staff were isolated in the observation ward of the accident and emergency department, which was vacated for the purpose. Those who were not as sick, or who were not admitted, were asked to return to a screening clinic, specially set up in the accident and emergency department, for follow up the next day. The screening clinic was also used to provide consultation and examination of other staff who developed fever and were suspected to have atypical pneumonia. 
Wednesday
3.37
Both DH and HA continued to strengthen their actions on outbreak and infection control. DH's New Territories East Regional Office set up a special control team to handle matters relating to the Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak, including case follow-up, c o n t a c t t r a c i n g a n d s u r v e i l l a n c e , epidemiological analysis, and prevention of spread to the community.
P r i n c e o f W a l e s H o s p i t a l implemented the following -
The 8th floor of the main building, where ward 8A was situated, had been made a restricted area Specific medical wards were designated cohort wards for cases of suspected and confirmed atypical pneumonia
The medical team was divided into a "dirty" team and a "clean" team. The former was responsible for taking care of patients with atypical pneumonia, while the latter was responsible for all non-atypical-pneumonia cases. There would be no crosscover between the two teams. The purpose was to prevent cross-contamination among staff and cross-infection to patients The Disease Control Centre was established to coordinate data collection and reporting, and facilitate exchange of information with DH for contact tracing and disease control.
Preliminary epidemiological findings
On 12.3.03, preliminary results of the epidemiological survey of sick hospital staff were presented by the community physician of the New Territories East Regional Office, as follows -
The incubation period was estimated to be between 1 and 7 days The mode of spread was probably droplets and through fomites, ie contaminated materials via body secretions. Based on the clinical symptoms of fever and chills, a working case definition was formulated for active case finding and surveillance.
Thursday
3.39
To improve communication and facilitate outbreak investigation, DH's New Territories East Regional Office stationed an initial team of staff which comprised an experienced medical officer and two nursing staff at Prince of Wales Hospital. The team commenced interviewing patients of ward 8A to identify the source of the outbreak and to assess the risk of spread to other patients. Prince of Wales Hospital introduced further control measures in response to the outbreak -Suspension of non-emergency surgical operations, day services and cardiac specialist out-patient clinics Diversion of patients with medical emergencies who were not pneumonia cases to nearby Alice Ho Miu Ling Nethersole Hospital and North District Hospital
Upgrading of droplet infection control guidelines and measures
Commencement of training sessions twice a week on infection control for staff Establishment of a "cluster meeting on atypical pneumonia", which met twice daily to steer direction and make decisions on disease and infection control.
Global alert
There was no doubt that the most significant event on 12.3.03 (Geneva time) was the announcement by WHO.
Based on the information supplied by DH on the Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak, WHO placed the international community on high alert about cases of acute respiratory syndrome with unknown aetiology in Vietnam, Hong Kong and Guangdong Province in China that appeared to place health workers at high risk.
A high level review
The outbreak situation in Prince of Wales Hospital was reviewed by SHWF on 13. 
3.41
In the afternoon of 14.3.03, SHWF held the first of a series of daily press briefings with a view to maintaining openness and transparency in the outbreak management. Two key messages were provided -Background pneumonia cases in Hong Kong on average totalled 1,500 -2,000 per month. Surveillance data at that time did not reveal any unusual or abnormal increase in cases in the community.
The Government was investigating four groups of cases of atypical pneumonia that appeared to have a tendency to affect healthcare workers - The case of a private doctor and three of his nursing staff, who were reported to have come down with pneumonia after seeing a patient.
3.42
By late evening of 14.3.03, the teams from DH's New Territories East Regional Office and Prince of Wales Hospital jointly confirmed that an in-patient of ward 8A, JJ, was the index case of the hospital outbreak. Because of clinical suspicion, the patient had already been placed in a single isolation room of ward 8A the day before. Both teams also agreed that persons exposed to JJ should be traced. They further agreed to share the workload as follows -For hospital staff, medical students and in-patients exposed to the index case, JJ, hospital management would initiate the work of contact tracing For hospital visitors and discharged patients who had been exposed to the index case, JJ, DH's New Territories East Regional Office would initiate the work of contact tracing
3.43
On the same day, Prince of Wales Hospital management decided to stop all clinical admissions to the medical department.
Saturday
3.44
On 15.3.03, WHO issued a rare emergency travel advisory in response to the reported outbreaks in a number of countries in Asia of a respiratory illness. It named the disease Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), declaring it a worldwide health threat.
Openness and transparency
WHO has praised Hong Kong openly on a number of occasions for its openness and transparency in the territory's management of the SARS epidemic. The "honesty is best" policy could be traced to three strategic decisions made on Friday, 14.3.03 at the weekly Senior Officials Meeting chaired by the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, as follows -Information on the outbreak should be disseminated to the public on a daily basis Advice should be given to the public on precautionary measures Hong Kong should work closely with international organisations and seek expert help if necessary.
3.45
WHO defined a suspected SARS case as disease in a person with a documented fever (temperature: >38 o C), lower respiratory tract symptoms, and contact with a person believed to have had SARS or a history of travel to a geographical area where there had been documented transmission of the illness. A suspected case that involved chest radiographic findings of pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, or an unexplained respiratory illness resulting in death with autopsy results demonstrating the pathology of acute respiratory distress syndrome without an identifiable cause was considered a probable case.
3.46
Although the emergency travel advisory issued on 15.3.03 did not contain a recommendation to member countries to restrict travel to any destination, all its recommendations were directed at preventing international spread of the disease, through professional and public awareness, heightened surveillance and the rapid implementation of case management. WHO subsequently issued a travel advisory against Hong Kong and Guangdong Province on 2.4.03.
The search for the index case
Intense efforts by the teams from DH's New Territories East Regional Office and Prince of Wales Hospital paid off on 14.3.03 when JJ was successfully identified as the index case of the hospital outbreak. The clues were cumulated over the previous few days. An epidemiology study conducted on the evening of 11.3.03 revealed that medical students and some staff not from ward 8A, but who had visited ward 8A, had also become affected. Subsequent interviews showed that they only went to ward 8A to attend selective patients. On 13.3.03, both teams undertook to review the contact and clinical history of ward 8A in-patients and those who had been discharged since mid-February with respiratory or unexplained febrile illness. In the process, JJ, who had the earliest date of onset of symptoms, was identified as the suspected index case.
JJ, aged 26, was admitted on 4.3.03 to ward 8A of Prince of Wales Hospital with a diagnosis of community-acquired pneumonia. He gave a history of fever, chills and rigor since 24.2.03. Six days after admission, his fever and chest condition gradually improved. Throughout this period, JJ had neither required assisted ventilation nor received treatment in the intensive care or high dependency care units, although he was put on nebuliser treatment between 6-12 March. Hence, he was never categorised as a case of severe community-acquired pneumonia, and his admission to ward 8A did not trigger off infection control measures, including droplet precautions. Similarly, no notification was activated to initiate case investigation and contact tracing.
Three relatives of JJ were noted to have been admitted with fever to Prince of Wales Hospital on late 13.3.03 and early 14.3.03. A fourth relative was identified to have been admitted to the private Baptist Hospital on 13.3.03. Detailed exposure history to JJ amongst sick staff was therefore specifically examined. It was not long before the linkage of sick healthcare staff to JJ was also established. Hence, JJ was confirmed in the evening of 14.3.03 as the index case of the Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak. Eventually, JJ's infection was linked to Professor AA through his visit to Hotel M.
The use of nebuliser treatment on JJ was subsequently identified on 18.3.03 as an important factor contributing to the extensive spread of the infection in ward 8A. In all, 143 individuals were subsequently found to have acquired the infection through direct contact with JJ, as follows -
Category of individuals Number
Healthcare workers 50
Medical students 17
Ward 8A 
18.3.03
The use of nebuliser on the index patient was identified as an important factor contributing to the extensive spread of SARS in ward 8A. An alert was issued by HA head office on the use of nebuliser in HA's Guidelines on Management of SARS the next day, 19.3.03.
19.3.03
DH announced the chain of transmission of the Hotel M cluster and established that the index patient of the Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak was connected to this cluster of infection.
20.3.03
Chief Executive of HA had a meeting with Prince of Wales Hospital management and the Faculty of Medicine, the Chinese University of Hong Kong regarding their concern on community spread and the need for urgent contact tracing. The meeting was triggered by the a d m i s s i o n o f t w o g e n e r a l practitioners, PP and NN from the Tai Po and Shatin districts. He later contacted the Deputy Director of Health around midnight on the need to step up contact tracing and disease control in the community.
21.3.03
Deputy Director of Health visited Prince of Wales Hospital and further enhanced DH's contact tracing team based in the hospital with the addition of a senior Principal Medical Officer. DH also extended its surveillance of SARS symptoms of visitors to all acute medical wards.
Contact tracing and workload
In the Prince of Wales Hospital outbreak, DH's New Territories East Regional Office interviewed cases referred by hospital physicians on a daily basis. For those who were seriously ill, their informants would be approached. Through these means, information on the contacts would be ascertained. Once identified, two specific public health actions would be taken, as follows -All contacts would be screened for symptoms of infection, and if negative, alerted to potential symptoms. They would be further advised to get in touch with the New Territories East Regional Office if they subsequently became ill. Additionally, advice on personal hygiene and measures to prevent respiratory tract infection would be provided Medical surveillance would be instituted for all contacts, initially for 14 days during the early phase of the epidemic and later for 10 days when the incubation period of the SARS virus was better documented, commencing from the last day of exposure to a case. Illustrated below was the initial workload of contact tracing at Prince of Wales Hospital.
As at 25.3.03, DH's New Territories East Regional Office successfully interviewed 386 cases, of whom 134 were eventually confirmed to have SARS, and followed up 1,884 contacts, of whom 59 eventually developed SARS. 
Decisions on hospital operations
Prince of Wales Hospital was severely hit by the SARS outbreak, with a total of 87 healthcare workers eventually becoming infected. In particular, the medical department was the most heavily inflicted, with 15 physicians acquiring the infection. In a rapidly changing situation, assessments had to be made continually on whether the hospital could continue to deliver services safely.
In providing information to the Committee, the New Territories East Cluster Chief Executive highlighted the establishment of the "cluster meeting on atypical pneumonia" on 13.3.03 as the paramount decisionmaking body. He mentioned that this forum met twice daily, at which decisions on hospital operations were made collectively. Membership included senior members of the cluster management, the chiefs of service (mostly professorial staff of the Chinese University of Hong Kong), various clinical heads, heads of infection control team and the Dean of the Faculty of Medicine, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He also described the level of input required from HA head office, particularly on matters requiring coordination or approval at the head office level, such as diverting emergency cases to other hospitals and closure of the accident and emergency department.
Based on the above structure and input from HA head office, a series of stepwise decisions were taken to curtail service provision and hospital operations, as follows - 
